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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

case No. 14635

INTERMOUNTAIN FARMERS
ASSOCIATION, a
corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF CASE
As pointed out in the Stipulation of Facts (Tr.
pages 88-124) , this is a civil action brought by plaintiffrespondent, Union Pacific Railroad Company (hereinafter
"Union Pacific"), seeking indemnification from defendantappellant, Intermountain Farmers Association (hereinafter
"Intermountain Farmers"), under one or more of the following
theories (Tr. page 97):
1.

Full indemnity under either contractual indemnity and/or implied indemnity;

2.

contribution under Section 78-27-39, U.C.A.
1953 (Supp. 1973);
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3.

Application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur.

Union Pacific accepts Intermountain Farmers' "DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT" and "RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL", but
its "STATEMENT OF FACTS" is not complete.

Therefore, Union

Pacific submits the following supplemental "STATEMENT OF
FACTS".
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As defendant states, this case was submitted to the
trial court on stipulated facts.

A copy of that stipulation,

without exhibits, is attached hereto for the court's convenient reference.
Defendant's "STATEMENT OF FACTS" is deficient
because it omits several pertinent portions of both the agreement between Union Pacific and Intermountain Farmers and the
judgment rendered by Judge Sawaya.

A complete statement of

the pertinent contractual provisions is as follows

(Tr.

pages 7-8) :
Section 1. The Lessor, for and in
consideration of the covenants and payments hereinafter mentioned to be performed and made by the Lessee, hereby
agrees to lease and let and does hereby
lease and let unto the Lessee . . . .
Section 5.
It is especially covenanted and agreed . . . that the Lessee
shall at all times protect the Lessor
and the leased premises from all injury,
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damage or loss by reason of the occupation of the leased premises by the
Lessee, or from any cause whatsoever
growing out of said Lessee's use thereof.
Section 8. No building, platform
or other structure shall be erected or
maintained and no material or obstruction
of any kind or character shall be placed,
piled, stored, stacked or maintained
closer than eight (8) feet six (6) inches
to the center line of the nearest track
of the Lessor; .
Section 11. The Lessee shall be
liable for any and all injury or damage
to persons or property, of whatsoever
nature or kind, arising out of or contributed to by any breach in whole or
in part of any covenant of this agreement.
[Emphasis added.]
A complete statement of the pertinent provisions of
Judge Sawaya's Conclusions of Law is as follows

(Tr. page 155):

1. The written Lease Agreement
between plaintiff and defendant requires
defendant to indemnify plaintiff for any
and all injuries that were sustained by
Richard V. Richins, an employee of the
plaintiff, on October 31, 1972, while performing his employment duties on railroad
trackage immediately adjacent to the premises covered by the subject Lease.
2. The Court further concludes that
the negligence of either party is not an
issue nor a necessary element to the conclusion of this action.
3. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment
against defendant in the sum of $165,632.50,
together with interest at 6% per annum pursuant to Section 15-1-1, U.C.A. 1953, from
and after October 31, 1973, to date hereof,
and together with costs and disbursements
herein incurred in the amount of $25.20.
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POINT I
THE INJURIES SUSTAINED BY MR. RICHINS ON
OCTOBER 31, 1972, WERE NOT CAUSED, IN WHOLE
OR IN PART, BY ANY NEGLIGENCE OF UNION PACIFIC.
On page 22 of its brief, Intermountain Farmers contends that Union Pacific's brakeman, Levi Ki Tua'one, negligently failed to maintain a proper lookout during the westbound train movement along the Poultry Track adjacent to
Intermountain Farmers' facility.

Intermountain Farmers fails

to point out, however, that there was fresh snow on the ground
at the time (Stipulation, • 7); that it was dark (Stipulation,
11 7);

and that although Mr. Tua'one was maintaining a lookout

he did not observe any obstacle to the movement of the train
(Stipulation, • 16).
In this regard, Mr. Tua'one testified that as the
train proceeded in a westbound direction onto the spur track
serving Intermountain Farmers "everything was covered with
snow"

(Deposition page 7, line 17; see also deposition page

6, lines 22-23).

The photographs attached to the Stipula-

tion of Facts as Exhibits "D", "E", "F",

"G", "H", and "I"

which were secured the morning following Mr. Richins' accident reasonably depict the conditions prevailing at the time
of the accident.

Mr. Tua'one also testified that he did not

see the spool of cable prior to the accident (Deposition page
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9, lines 13-15) and in retrospect believes that this was
solely due to the snow (Deposition page 9, lines 23-25; page
10, lines 2-6; page 32, lines 22-25; page 33, lines 1-3).
In short, there is no factual basis whatsoever to
even infer that Mr. Tua'one or Union Pacific was negligent
or that either failed to act in a reasonable and prudent
manner under all of the circumstances.
POINT II
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, UNION PACIFIC HAD BEEN
NEGLIGENT, WHICH NEGLIGENCE UNION PACIFIC
EXPRESSLY DENIES, SUCH NEGLIGENCE WOULD BE
IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE.
A.

Applicable sections of the agreement between

Intermountain Farmers and Union Pacific make the question of
negligence irrelevant.
Section 11 of the agreement between Intermountain.
Farmers and Union Pacific requires Intermountain Farmers to
indemnify Union Pacific for any injuries to persons "arising
out of or contributed to by any breach in whole or in part"
of any covenant of the subject agreement, and Section 8 of
the agreement prohibits the placement or maintenance of any
material or obstruction within eight feet six inches of the
center line of the track on which Richins' accident occurred.
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It is undisputed that at the time Mr. Richins sustained his
1
injury, the spool of cable which his foot hit was located
within the proscribed clearance zone (Stipulation, ,, 26).
Consequently, it is clear that the provisions of Section 8
of the agreement were breached by the mere existence of the
spool of cable within the proscribed clearance zone and that
Union Pacific is entitled to full indemnity in accordance
with the provisions of Section 11 of the agreement.
Furthermore, it is also clear that Intermountain
Farmers owned the spool of cable (Stipulation, ,,,, 5, 25, and
28) and maintained it upon the leased premises (Stipulation,
,, 29).

Consequently, it is clear that Mr. Richins' injuries

were sustained as a direct result of Intermountain Farmers'
use and occupation of the leased premises, thus providing
Union Pacific with a second independent basis for contractual
indemnification under the provisions of Sections 5 and 11 of
the agreement.
1

See the following excerpt from page 18 of Intermountain Farmers' brief on appeal
As the train commenced moving out of
the yard, a portion of the engine
apparently again passed near the spool
where the leg of the conductor, Richins,
evidently, in some manner, came in contact with the spool, causing him to
fall to the ground resulting in severe
injuries to his right leg.
and the first full paragraph of page 4 of defendant's Trial
Memorandum (Tr. page 72).
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B.

Under applicable case law the question of negli-

gence is irrelevant.
In Minneapolis-Moline Co. v. Chicago, M., ST. P. &
P. R. Co., 199 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1952), the railroad sought
contractual indemnity, under clauses similar to those in
issue here, from an industry in a situation where one of the
industry's employees had been injured when a train struck a
metal box located within the proscribed minimum clearance
requirements of the industry track contract.

The court, in

holding that the railroad was entitled to recover full indemnity from the industry, ruled (1) that the railroad, in
making the contract covering property located on its right
of way, acted in a private capacity and not as a common carrier
and, consequently, could exact its own conditions as to occupancy;

(2) that the industry's obligation to keep the tracks

unobstructed was absolute and unqualified;

(3) that the

industry's liability doesn't depend upon negligence or tort
but that such liability arises from breach of contract; and
(4)

that the industry could have made negligence a condition

of liability but since it didn't it would not be heard to
complain of the choice it made.

With particular application

to the present case is the statement of the court at page 731:
The Railroad Company's cause of action
against the Moline Company, however, is
not primarily based upon tort, nor is
it dependent upon negligence. The liability of the Moline Company arises from
-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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its breach of this indemnity provision
of the contract. The rule as to proximate cause is not available to the
Moline Company because by its contract
it agreed to indemnify against loss
"from and against any and all damages,
remote as well as proximate, in any
wise resulting from any non-performance
or non-observance of the foregoing
covenant concerning lateral distance
or perpendicular height, for which the
Railway Company shall become, in whole
or in part, liable or be charged."
The jury, in answer to an interrogatory
proposed by appellant, found that
plaintiff's injuries resulted in whole
or in part from "the presence of the
trash box within six feet laterally at
right angles from the nearer rail of
track 4." It thus appears that the
damages from which the appellant
agreed to hold the Railroad Company
harmless need not have been caused
solely by any negligence on its part,
nor was the act of the Moline Company
required to be the proximate cause of
the loss. A liability resulted even
though such act were the remote cause.
The case of John P. Gorman Coal
Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 213 Ky.
551, 281 s.w. 487, is strikingly similar
in its facts to the case at bar.
In
that case the Coal Company agreed to
maintain and keep the tracks free from
obstructions and to hold the Railroad
harmless on account of any loss arising
from a violation of the provision.
In
the course of the opinion it is said:
"The obligation to keep the
tracks free from obstruction, and
to hold the appellee harmless from
any claims on account of any failure on appellant's part to so keep
the tracks, is an absolute one.
Appellant might have made it a
condition of liability that it should
be guilty of some negligence, but
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this it did not do.
It was
free to make any contract it
chose so long as it was not
against public policy, and,
having chosen to undertake an
absolute liability rather than
a qualified one, it cannot now
be heard to complain of the
choice it made."
[Emphasis
added.]
In Northern P. Ry. co. v. National Cylinder G. Div.
of C.C., 467 P.2d 884 (Wash. 1970), the railroad was awarded
full contractual indemnity from a rail welding contractor for
injuries sustained by a railroad employee whose leg was
crushed by a moving rail.

The court took special note of the

fact that the agreement was silent on the question of whether
the negligence of either party was relevant to the obligation
of the industry to indemnify the railroad and concluded that
causation rather than negligence controlled.

In this regard,

the court states at pages 887-88:
The trial court conunented in its
oral opinion it was significant the
agreement at no point mentioned the
word "negligent" or any concept of
fault.
It noted the language used concerned itself solely with the occurrence
of an incident which would later give
rise to a claim or lawsuit . . . .
The trial court concluded the
agreement was a clear undertaking
based upon causation rather than
negligence or fault and had the intention of the parties been otherwise,
they could clearly and simply have provided in the agreement that the obligation to indemnify would be subject
to fault on the part of National in
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connection with some phase of the
welding operation. •
National argues that inasmuch
as the trial court did not find
negligence on its part, it cannot
be required to indemnify Northern
Pacific. Under the terms of the
indemnity provision of the contract,
the trial court's finding that
National's activities caused the
injuries out of which the claim arose
is sufficient to establish liability.
See also Louisiana

&

Arkansas Railway Co. v. Anthony, 199 F.Supp,

286 (W.D. Ark. 1961), aff'd 316 F.2d 858 (8th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied 375 U.S. 830 (1963).
In Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Rental Storage & T.
Co., 524 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. 1975), the railroad company sought
contractual indemnity from an industry pursuant to the provisions of a spur track agreement for $63,500, which it had
paid to an employee's widow under the provisions of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act.

During a switching movement

over this spur, the widow's decedent had been caught and
crushed to death between a boxcar and a loading dock.

The

contract, in relevant part, required the industry to indemnify
the railroad for any liability, claims or losses which were
"in any manner caused by, arising out of or connected with"
its covenant to maintain proper, horizontal clearances
between the center line of the spur track and any buildings,
structures, fixtures, materials or obstructions.

524 S.W.2d

-10-
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at 902.

The trial court awarded judgment to the railroad

and the industry appealed, claiming that the railroad had
failed to establish that the railroad's liability accrued
as a direct and proximate cause of the industry's breach of
the close clearance covenant.

In this regard, there was

evidence that the industry's lessee may have been the party
directly responsible for the close clearance impairment.
The Missouri Court of Appeals first expressly rejected any
suggestion that common law tort concepts of proximate cause
were applicable, 524 S.W.2d at 910, and then held that the
"arising out of or connected with" language of the contract
controlled.

524 S.W.2d at 909-10.

It is significant to note that the provisions of
Sections 1, 5, 8, and 11 of the agreement between Intermountain Farmers and Union Pacific do not mention the concept
of negligence and/or fault.

Section 11 provides that Inter-

mountain Farmers shall be liable for any and all injury to
any person "arising out of or contributed to by any breach
in whole or in part of any covenant of this agreement".

This language is completely free from any ambiguity and is
as absolute in its terms as is the language in Section 8
wherein Intermountain Farmers covenanted not to place, pile,
store, stack or maintain any material or obstruction of any
kind or character closer than eight feet six inches to the
center line of the nearest Union Pacific track.

Based upon
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this language and the authorities discussed above, Union
Pacific clearly is entitled to full indemnification from
Intermountain Farmers.

c.

Even if Union Pacific were negligent in the

manner claimed by Intermountain Farmers, which negligence
Union Pacific expressly denies, such negligence would not
be sufficient to bar Union Pacific's recovery.
As in the instant case, the industry in Missouri
Pacific, supra, also claimed that the railroad was not entitled
to indemnification under the contract because it was guilty
of contributory negligence.

The industry phrased this con-

tention in terms of "knowing acquiescence" by the switch
crew,of which the widow's decedent was a member, in continuing
operations in the face of the open and obvious hazard presented by the material which was stacked in violation of the
close clearance covenant in the contract.
this defense on several grounds.

The court rejected

First, it noted that the

defense is strictly limited when the right to indemnity
arises ex contractu as was the situation in the case before
it.

The court went on, however, to analyze this defense as

if plaintiff's action was premised on implied rather than
contractual indemnity.

The court noted that essentially two

elements are necessary in order for the defense to be successfully asserted.

First, it must be established that the rail-
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road had long, continued awareness of the dangerous condition
and had completely failed to take any corrective action or
to request the industry to do so.

Secondly, it must also

be established that the railroad's conduct was so seriously
wrong that it would be inequitable to order full restitution.
The court then stated that "Something more than imputed legal
knowledge of a temporary, though dangerous condition is
required, and that is all the evidence suggests here."

524

S.W.2d at 911.
In the instant case, the record indicates that the
spool of cable had not been observed in the vicinity of the
track on the day prior to Richins' accident (Stipulation, •
29); that Richins' accident occurred at night under poor
lighting conditions (Stipulation, ,, 7); and that the area
in question was covered with fresh snow (Stipulation, ,, 7).
Consequently, even if Intermountain Farmers' argument that
Union Pacific is barred from seeking indemnity because of
Mr. Tua'one's failure to detect the spool of cable in time
to prevent Mr. Richins' injury was relevant in the face of
the contractual provisions involved here, it is clear from
the foregoing that such evidence would not be sufficient to
bar Union Pacific's action for indemnity.
Based upon the foregoing, Union Pacific is clearly
entitled, under the facts in this case, to recover full
indemnity from Intermountain Farmers.
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POINT III
UNION PACIFIC IS NOT SEEKING RECOVERY FOR
ITS OWN NEGLIGENCE IN THIS ACTION BUT,
RATHER, IS SEEKING RECOVERY FOR LIABILITY
WHICH WAS VICARIOUSLY IMPOSED UPON IT BY
THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT FOR
THE BREACH OF A CONTRACTUAL DUTY OWED IT
BY INTERMOUNTAIN FARMERS.
Under the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 u.s.c.A. § 51, et

~·

a railroad has a non-

delegable duty to furnish its employees with a safe place in
which to work, regardless of whether or not it has actual
2

control over the premises upon which the injury occurred.
A railroad is liable under this Act for injuries to its
employees which are caused, in whole or in part, by any
negligence, no matter how slight, upon the part of the railroad or the injured employee's co-workers.
Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 (1956).

Rogers v. Missouri
A railroad is pre-

eluded from delegating its responsibilities under the Act
to a third party; however, it can indemnify itself through
a contract such that a third party may be required to satisfy
2

For an excellent discussion of this point in a
case quite similar to the one at bar, see Missouri Pacific
R. Co. v. Rental Storage & T. Co., supra.
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the railroad's statutory obligation by compensating the injured
employee for his injury.

Scherff v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas

Railroad Co., 449 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1971); Beachboard v.
Southern Railway Company, 193 S.E.2d 577 (N.C. 1972); Inland
Container Corp. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 266 F.2d 857
(5th Cir. 1959) .
Even though the subject agreement does not mention
the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, Intermountain Farmers is still held to have known of the existence
of this federal statute at the time it executed the subject
agreement.

Oregon Short Line R. co. v. Idaho Stockyards co.,

12 Utah 2d 205, 364 P.2d 826 (1961); Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Nielsen, 448 F.2d 121 (10th Cir. 1971).
Furthermore, a railroad may be guilty of passive negligence
and therefore liable to its employee under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act and still recover full indemnity from the
industry.

Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Co. v. Anthony, supra;

Booth-Kelly Lumber co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 183 F.2d 902
(9th Cir. 1950).

See also Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Rental

Storage and T. Co., supra.
In the Anthony case, supra, the railroad sought contractual indemnity from a shipper under a spur track agreement for the amount paid by the railroad to one of its
employees under the provisions of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act for injuries which he had sustained when he
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struck the overhang of a moveable shed which had been placed
in close proximity to the spur track in violation of the
close clearance provision of the spur track agreement.

The

court, in holding that the railroad was entitled to full
indemnity, stated on pages 298-99:
The railway company can be guilty
of passive negligence and therefore
liable to the claimant under its nondelegable duties as set forth in the
F.E.L.A. and still recover full indemnity from the industry. (Citations
omitted)
The question of liability of the
industry in such cases is to be determined from the indemnity contract and
the parties' negligence is to be determined on the basis of the F.E.L.A., 45
u.s.c.A. § 51 et seq., not common law
negligence.
(Citations omitted)

This is a case, then, in which the
defendant industry was actively negligent in creating and not correcting the
unsafe condition adjoining the spur
track which caused the accident, while
the plaintiff's only negligence consisted
of the defendants' negligence vicariously
imputed to it by virtue of its nondelegable duty to its employee, • . . to provide him with a safe place to work.
Accord, Baltimore and Ohio R. Co. v. Alpha Portland Cement

co.,

218 F.2d 207 (3d Cir. 1955).
In the landmark Booth-Kelly case, supra, the railroad sought contractual indemnity from the industry for the
full amount paid to an employee under the provisions of the
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Federal Employers' Liability Act for injuries sustained by
the employee when he struck a wood cart left by the
industry within 42 inches of the nearest rail.

The trial

court awarded the railroad only one-half of the claimed
amount and both parties appealed.

The Ninth Circuit Court

of Appeals remanded the case with directions to award the
railroad full indemnity under the spur track agreement.
The court differentiated between "active" and "passive"
negligence, concluding that the industry was actively negligent in placing and leaving the cart within 42 inches from
the track and that the railroad was passively negligent
because of its failure "to make safe a dangerous condition
of land or chattels, which was created by the misconduct
of another, i.e., of Booth-Kelly."

183 F.2d at 911.

The

court further remarked that "Southern Pacific seeks indemnity not for its own negligence, but rather for that of
Booth-Kelly."

Id. at 912.

In discussing Southern Pacific's

negligence, the court stated:
Basic in any determination of the
meaning of this whole paragraph is an
understanding that when the parties contemplated that there might be claims
for indemnity they must have been cognizant of the fact that in the ordinary
case the occasion for seeking indemnity
would not arise unless the indemnitee
had himself been found guilty of some
fault, for otherwise no judgment could
have been recovered from him. That this
is typically true is recognized in the
comment under Section 95, Restatement
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on Restitution, as follows: "In all of
these situations the payer is not barred
by the fact that he was negligent in
failing to discover or to remedy the
defect as a result of which the harm was
occasioned; in most of the cases it is
because of this failure that he is liable
. . 183 F.2d at 907.
The Utah courts have recognized this distinction
between "active" and "passive" negligence in a number of
different cases.

Salt Lake City v. Schubach, 108 Utah 266,

159 P.2d 149 (1945); Holmstead v. Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc.,
27 Utah 2d 109, 493 P.2d 625 (1972); and Barr v. Brezina
Construction Co., 464 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied
409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
In Gollick v. New York Central Railroad Company,
138 F.Supp. 384 (E.D. Mich. 1956), the railroad sought contractual indemnity from the industry for the amount which it
had paid to an employee pursuant to the provisions of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act.

The railroad company

employee was knocked off the side of a boxcar upon which he
was riding when his body contacted a steel "I" beam located
perpendicularly between two sets of tracks running into the
industry's plant.

The "I" beam was a part of the brace for

a special door installed by the industry.

When the door

was opened it was necessary to separately remove the "I"

beam and slide it to the side so that there would be sufficient clearance for railroad switching operations.

This
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accident happened at night after the industry employees had
left the plant.

The court concluded from the evidence that

the door in question was opened by railroad employees who
failed to remove the "I" beam.

Even though the specific

contractual indemnification language in question did not
provide for the railroad to be indemnified for its own negligence, the court held that the railroad was entitled to full
indemnification in the following language:
We pass to the question of whether
or not the contract intended to include
indemnity of the Railroad Company where
the accident was caused in part by
negligence of its own employees. Paragraph Third of the indemnity contract,
after providing that the Industry shall
not place nor allow any temporary or
permanent structure or obstruction
within six feet laterally of the tracks
then said:
"The industry shall indemnify,
and hold harmless, the Railroad
Company from any and all liability
for loss of life or damage or injury
to property or persons (including
employees and property of either of
the parties hereto) , arising by reason
of, or which in any way results
from, the existence or maintenance
of structures or obstructions at
clearances less than standard (six
feet) * * * n • • •
The Industry "maintained" the "I" beam
and in view of the language above quoted
it is clear that the intent of the parties
was that if the obstruction in any way
contributed to the injury, the Industry
was to indemnify the Railroad Company
therefor without regard to the latter's
negligence . . . .
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In the case at bar Gollick's injuries,
regardless of whether they were contributed to by the train crew's failure
to remove the "I" beam, were also caused
by the Industry's negligent violation
of its contract, to-wit: maintenance of
a structure closer than six feet laterally
to the tracks. Under the contract it was
the Industry's duty to see that the "I"
beam was removed. Having failed to do so
renders the Industry liable.
138 F.Supp.
at 387-88.
Union Pacific's liability to Mr. Richins arose
solely by virtue of its nondelegable duty under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51,

et~

(Stipu-

lation, tt 33, 39, and 40), to provide him with a safe place
in which to work.

The property where the accident occurred

was under the complete control of Intermountain Farmers.
The spool of cable was owned and maintained on the property
by Intermountain Farmers.

Clearly, the accident occurred

because Intermountain Farmers failed to comply with the close
clearance covenant in the agreement.

It is this failure on

Interrnountain Farmers' part for which Union Pacific was
vicariously liable to Mr. Richins under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act.

Therefore, Union Pacific's negligence, if

any, under the circumstances, was at most passive or. derivative in character.

Consequently, Union Pacific is entitled

to recover full indemnification from Intermountain Farmers.
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POINT IV
THE CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED BY INTERMOUNTAIN FARMERS IN ITS BRIEF ARE NOT IN
POINT AND ARE NOT RESPONSIVE TO THE LEGAL
AND/OR FACTUAL ISSUES PRESENTED IN THIS
CASE.
Intermountain Farmers' brief relies extensively
on this court's decision in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v.
El Paso Natural Gas Co., 17 Utah 2d 255, 408 P.2d 910 (1965).
In that case, the railroad sought indemnity under the provisions of an agreement providing for the construction and
maintenance of a pipeline for damages paid to an El Paso
employee who sustained personal injuries in an accident
which occurred at a railroad crossing located one and one-half
miles from the pipeline covered by the subject agreement.
The railroad admitted that it was negligent but sought
indemnity under a general indemnity clause, arguing that
"but for" the existence of the pipeline to which the El Paso
employee was traveling at the time he sustained injury the
railroad crossing accident would not have occurred.

This

court rejected this "but for" argument in the following
language:
The fair import of the entire provision,
considered together in context as it
should be, is that the damages guaranteed
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against should have at least some
causal connection with the construction,
existence, maintenance or operation of
the pipeline other than an incident
which happened merely coincidental to
its existence.
408 P.2d at 914.
The court concluded that the occurrence of the crossing accident was an unforeseen and unrelated event which was not
within the contemplation of the parties at the time the
pipeline agreement was executed.

Clearly, this was not

the situation in the case at bar.
Intermountain Farmers also cites the Utah cases
of Jankele v. Texas, 88 Utah 325, 54 P.2d 425 (1936); Walker
Bank & Trust co. v. First Security Corp., 9 Utah 2d 215, 341
P.2d 944 (1959); Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 398
P.2d 207 (1965); and Howe Rents

Corporation v. Worthen, 18

Utah 2d 263, 420 P.2d 848 (1966), in support of its position
on appeal, none of which is relevant to the facts or legal

issues in this case.
In the Jankele case, supra, the plaintiffs entered
into an agreement with the defendant oil company for the
installation by the oil company of certain gasoline pumps
and tanks on property owned by the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs

further agreed to purchase the oil and gas which they intended
to sell to the public at this location from the defendant.
The defendant negligently installed one of the tanks such
that a joint on the line leading from the tank to the pump
-22-
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could not withstand normal settling of the tank and ruptured.
During a period of approximately four months, over 3,000
gallons of gasoline with a value of $615 were lost through
this ruptured joint.

The plaintiff sued the defendant for

the value of this gasoline pursuant to the agreement between
the parties which contained the following language:
The dealer shall * * * at his expense
keep said equipment in good order and
repair; * * * exonerate the company
and hold it harmless from all claims,
suits and liabilities of every character whatsoever and howsoever arising
from the existence or use of said equipment.
54 P.2d at 426.
The defendant asserted this clause as a complete defense to
the plaintiff's claims.

The trial court entered judgment

for the plaintiff and the Supreme Court of Utah affirmed.
The crux of the matter in the court's view was whether or
not the quoted language exempted the defendant from liability
for negligent installation of the equipment.

The court deter-

mined that the foregoing language manifestly did not on its
face exempt the defendant from such liability.

The court

admittedly indicated that there was some question as to
whether or not the defendant could relieve itself by contract from its own negligence, but it did not squarely address
the issue other than to indicate that there were situations
where a party could do so.

The court felt that it was not

necessary to decide this question because the contract only
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sought to exonerate the defendant for liabilities "arising
from the existence or use of said equipment" and not from
liabilities incurred in instal.ling the equipment.
In the instant case, the contract clearly covers
the liability over which Union Pacific brought suit.

In

addition, there is no evidence of negligence on Union Pacific's
part.

Even assuming that Mr. Tua'one's conduct was negligent,

which negligence Union Pacific expressly denies, such negligence could not be construed to be more than passive in
nature and this could not serve to bar Union Pacific's
action for indemnification.
In the Walker Bank case, supra, the defendant's
predecessor in interest, Commercial Bank, had failed to pay
the premiums on a life insurance policy upon the life of one
Nancy Galligher in accordance with an authorization furnished
by her.

Walker Bank, as the guardian of her children,

sought and recovered a judgment from the defendant in the
amount of the insurance policy.

The decedent had signed a

"sight draft authorization" which authorized the Commercial
Bank to charge her account on a monthly basis with the drafts
which were to be drawn by her insurance company.

At some

point in time the bank lost the authorization and started
to return the monthly sight drafts to the insurance company
with a notation "not authorized"; however, the bank never
notified the decedent of this action.

The authorization
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which the decedent signed also contained an indemnification
clause which required the decedent to hold the bank harmless
for any liability resulting from its compliance with the
authorization.

This court in affirming the trial court's

award of judgment to the plaintiff stated that this language
purports only to protect the bank from
liability arising from its compliance
with the authorization, . . • It is
likewise not unreasonable to assume that
what the bank was being protected for
was a debiting of the account for the
amount drawn; and that the drawer of the
drafts might draw for too much money, or
too many drafts, or that some other such
mistake might occur for which it did not
want to be responsible. But there is no
provision that it would be protected in
the event of entire failure to fulfill
the arrangement.
341 P.2d at 947.
Clearly, if the court had not interpreted the clause in this
fashion there would have been a complete failure of consideration for the
bank.

agreement

between the decedent and the

Obviously, the decedent had to keep money on account

with the bank in order for the authorization to be honored.
On the other hand, the fact that the bank offered this service undoubtedly acted as an inducement to the decedent to
keep her funds on account with the bank.

If the bank could,

at any time, arbitrarily and unilaterally cease paying the
insurance premiums without notifying the depositor of this
action, the agreement signed by the decedent would have no
value whatsoever.
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In the instant case, Union Pacific leased certain
land to Intermountain Farmers.

Although Intermountain Farmers

thereby acquired complete control and dominion over the
leased premises, Union Pacific employees were still required
to work on or about said premises.

As partial consideration

for the execution of this agreement, Intermountain Farmers
expressly and explicitly agreed to keep an area eight feet
six inches on either side of the center line of this track
clear of any obstructions or obstacles of any kind or nature
whatsoever.

Further, Interrnountain Farmers agreed to assume

complete liability for any injury to any person as a result
of its failure to keep this area free of obstructions.

Inter-

mountain Farmers did not keep the area free from obstructions
and Mr. Richins was seriously injured as a direct consequence
thereof.

Clearly, his injury resulted as a direct and proxi-

mate cause of Intermountain Farmers' failure to comply with
the affirmative action requirements of the close clearance
covenant.

If Intermountain Farmers is not held responsible

for the injury to Mr. Richins, a significant failure of consideration would result and the clear intent of the parties
would be abrogated.
In the Barrus case, supra, an employee of an insurance company which had leased a portion of a building for
office space slipped and fell in a common hallway in that
building.

She sued the landlords for damages and they, in
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turn, impleaded the insurance company, seeking indemnification
under the terms of an indemnification clause contained in the
lease.

This clause provided in relevant part that the land-

lords would be liable to the employees of the tenant insurance
company for any injuries inflicted upon them as a result of
the negligence of the landlords.

The insurance company, on

the other hand, agreed to indemnify the landlords for any
damage or liability resulting to the landlords from the
injury to any person which was caused by an act of the insurance company or any of its officers, agents or employees.
The trial court granted the insurance company's motion to
dismiss and the Supreme Court of Utah affirmed, pointing out
that the clause in question expressly made the landlords
responsible for their own negligent acts.
Unlike the landlords in the Barrus case, Union
Pacific is not seeking indemnification under a contract where
it is expressly responsible for its own negligence.

Moreover,

due to the provisions of the FELA, Union Pacific, unlike the
landlords, was liable to the injured person even though its
negligence, if any, was merely derivative rather than active
in a traditional common law sense.

Consequently, it seems

clear that the Barrus case actually supports Union Pacific's
position.
In the Howe Rents

case, supra, a bailor sued a

bailee for damages to a cement mixer which allegedly had been
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negligently attached to the bailee's truck by the bailer.
The cement mixer came loose and overturned.

The bailer sued

for damages under a portion of the contract of bailment which
rendered the bailee liable for all damage to equipment
regardless of cause.

The trial court refused to allow the

defendant to prove that the accident was caused by the negligent acts of the bailer.

This court reversed with instructions

to allow the defendant to assert the bailor's negligence as
a defense.
In the instant case, there is no evidence of negligence on Union Pacific's part.

Even assuming that Mr. Tua'one's

failure to detect the spool of cable prior to the accident
constituted negligence, which negligence is expressly denied,
such negligence would at best be passive rather than active,
a distinction recognized by the court in Barrus, which case
was heavily relied upon by the court in Howe Rents.

More-

over, Intermountain Farmers failed to perform a duty which
it had specifically covenanted to perform, i.e., keep an area
eight feet six inches wide from the center line of the track
free of any obstacles or other material, which failure directly
and proximately caused Mr. Richins' injuries.

Furthermore,

the contract in the instant case clearly, unequivocally, and
in absolute terms spells out Intermountain Farmers' obligation if it fails to comply with the covenant.

Together,

Sections 11 and 8 simply state that if Intermountain Farmers
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allows anything to get within eight feet six inches of the
center of the track and someone is hurt as a result thereof,
Intermountain Farmers is solely responsible therefor.
It must be emphasized that in each of the foregoing cases relied upon by Intermountain Farmers the negligence of the indernnitee was either admitted or conclusively
established.

Furthermore, none of the foregoing cases

involves the special relationship which exists between an
interstate railroad and its employees under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act nor do any of them involve a contract between such a railroad and an industry whereby the
railroad sought to protect itself from liability which may
accrue to it while employees are performing work on land
which is under the domination and control of the industry.
The relationship between a railroad and its employees under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act is unique.

The threshold

of negligence which an employee must establish in order to
recover is extremely low and is quite different from the
normal threshold of negligence which prevails at common law.
Moreover, the Federal Employers' Liability Act provides for
pure comparative negligence--a situation which exists in
very few other areas of the law.

Finally, and probably most

significant, none of the cases cited by Intermountain Farmers
distinguishes between the concept of liability for breach of
covenant as opposed to liability for tort.

For all of these
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reasons, the Utah cases relied upon by Intermountain Farmers
are completely inappropriate.
Intermountain Farmers cites

~ ~ortion

of 41 Am. Jur.

2d Indemnity § 15 on pages 21-22 of its brief on appeal; however, the portion of said section which pertains to this
lawsuit and which was omitted by Intermountain Farmers in
its brief further provides as follows:
It has been said that the general
rule is not necessarily designed to
frustrate coverage of the indemnity
clause as against losses partially
attributable to negligence of the
indemnitee; rather, the rule is
commonly stated in support of conclusions against coverage in cases
where the precise nature of the
relationship between the indemnitee's
negligence and the particular loss
or claim is such as to negate any
intent that the parties designed
to cover it by their agreement of
indemnification.
41 Am. Jur. 2d
Indemnitv § 15, pages 700-01.
Furthermore, Intermountain Farmers cites 19 A.L.R. 3d 936 on
page 27 of its brief on appeal but fails to note the following
qualifying language appearing at the beginning of the annotation at 19 A.L.R. 3d 930:
Excluded from this annotation
are those cases in which indemnity
or contribution is sought upon the
basis of an express contract providing
for indemnity or contribution between
the joint tortfeasors.
Finally, Intermountain Farmers quotes extensively
from Chicago & Illinois Midland Ry. Co. v. Evans Const. co.,
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208 N.E.2d 573 (Ill. 1965), an implied indemnity case which
does not address the concept of contractual indemnity at all.
The same infirmity applies to the case of Union Stock Yds.
Co. v. Chicago &c. R.R. Co., 196 U.S. 217 (1905), cited in
the Chicago & Illinois Midland Ry· Co. case.

Consequently,

the legal principles and the holdings of the Chicago & Illinois
Midland Ry. Co. case and the Union Stock Yds. co. case have
absolutely no application to the trial court's decision in
the instant case.
CONCLUSION
There is no factual or legal basis whatsoever upon
which to sustain a claim that Union Pacific, its agents or
employees were in any manner negligent or that such negligence
caused Mr. Richins' injuries.

Even if Union Pacific were

in fact negligent in some manner, which Union Pacific expressly
denies, the trial court correctly ruled that "the negligence
of either party is not an issue nor a necessary element to
the conclusion of this action" because Intermountain Farmers'
liability is clearly founded upon breach of covenant rather
than tort liability.
The language of the lease agreement prohibited
any obstruction within the clearance zone regardless of
negligence on the part of either party.

Since the spool of
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mountain Farmers and was located within the area expressly
prohibited by Section 8 of the subject agreement.

Mr. Richins'

injuries were the direct result of Intermountain Farmers'
breach of the close clearance covenant.

Section 8 of the

agreement imposed an absolute responsibility upon Intermountain Farmers to keep the specified clearance zone free from
obstruction regardless of the identity of the person(s)
responsible for placing, piling, storing, stacking or maintaining the obstruction.

Moreover, none of the pertinent

provisions of the lease (Sections 1, 5, 8, and 11) mentions
the words "negligence" or "fault" but, rather, imposes liability upon Intermountain Farmers for the breach of any
covenant, regardless of the question of negligence.
Union Pacific's liability to Mr. Richins arose
solely by virtue of its nondelegable duty to provide a safe
place to work under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
45 U.S.C.A. § 51, et seq., which vicariously imputed Intermountain Farmers' negligence to it.

Since Union Pacific's

negligence in this regard was derivative or, at most,
passive in character, it is, under the cases and authorities
discussed above, clearly entitled to recover full indemnification from Intermountain Farmers.
Finally, the cases and authorities cited by Intermountain Farmers are not in point and involve factual situations which are vastly different from the instant case.
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Intermountain Farmers has not cited one case involving a
suit by a railroad against an industry for contractual
indemnification for damages paid to an employee under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act in support of its position.
To the contrary, the overwhelming weight of authority in
such situations completely supports the trial court's decision.
Based upon the foregoing, Union Pacific respectfully requests that the decision of the lower court be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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APPENDIX A

STEVEN A. GOODSELL
Attorney for Plaintiff
600 Union Pacific Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 363-1454

F. ROBERT BAYLE
Bayle and Lauchnor
Attorneys for Defendant

~;~~ ~~~;ig~~~~lu~:gk :~i~~ing
Telephone:

364-3627

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

STIPULATION OF FACTS
)

il'ITERMOUNTAIN FAR!1ERS
ASSOCIATION, a.corporation,

)

Defendant.

Civil No. 215754

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between the parties
hereto, through their respective counsel, that the above case
be submitted to the Court for ruling without a jury, based upon
the following stipulated facts:
1.

Union Pacific Railroad Company is now, and has

been at all times material hereto, a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the State of Utah, operating a railroad system in the State of Utah and in surrounding states.
2.

Intermountain Farmers Association is now, and

has been at all times material hereto, a corporation organized
and existing under the laws of the State of Utah.
3.

On February 6, 1964, plaintiff and its lessor,

Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Company, entered into a written
agreement with defendant (hereinafter referred to as "Subject
Agreement"), a copy of which is attached hereto, marked Exhibit
"A", and by this reference made a part hereof, that provides in
general for the leasing of certain property (hereinafter referred
to as the "Leased Premises"), at Draper, Salt Lake County, Utah,
for a \·:arehouse, grainery, cold storage, platfor.n, and drivei:·lay
site.
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4.

Pursuant to an extension rider dated October 9,

1968, a copy of which is attached hereto, marked Exhibit "B"
and by this reference made a part hereof, and an addendum, dated
December 31, 1970, a copy of which is attached hereto, ma·cked
Exhibit "C", and by chis reference made a part hereof, the
terms and conditions of the Subject Agreement were in full force
and effect to and including November 30, 1973.
5.

At approximately 7:00 o'clock p.m., on October 31,

1972, at a time when the Subject Agreement was in full force
and effect, and while plaintiff's employees were performing a
switching operation on the railroad track immediately adjacent
to the Leased Premises, one Richard V. Richins, conductor in
charge and an employee of plaintiff, sustained severe and
permanent injuries.

Richins claims that he sustained such in-

juries when knocked from the second locomotive unit of a twounit diesel engine upon which he was riding by a spool of cable
owned by Intermountain Farmers, said spool of cable being located
on the Leased Premises in a position closer than eight (8) feet
six (6) inches to the center line of the nearest track of the
plaintiff.
6.

At the time Richins sns tained said injuries,

plaintiff was engaged as a common carrier in interstate commerce;
Richins was employed by plaintiff in such commerce; and Richins'
said injuries occurred in the scope and course of his employment
for plaintiff.
7.

At the time Richins sustained his injuries, it

was dark and it had just recently stopped snowing.

There was

some snow on the ground, as evidenced by the photographs secured
on the morning following the accident and attached hereto as
Exhibits ttnu,

11

E11 ,

made a part hereof.

11

F11

,

11

G", "H" and

11

1", and by this reference

In addition, attached hereto as Exhibit "J",

and by this reference made a part hereof, is a copy of a Local

-2-
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Climatological Data Report showing weather conditions and precipitation levels recorded at the Salt Lake International Airport during the month of October 1972.

The scene of the

accident is approximately 18 to 20 miles from said weather
reporting station in a southeasterly direction.
8.
tive units,

The train in question, consisting of two locomo~velve

loaded cars,

~ency

empty cars, and a caboose,

departed Salt Lake City, Utah, at approximately 6:00 o'clock
p.m., on October 31, 1972, en route to Provo, Utah.
9.

The train arrived at Intermountain Farmers Asso-

ciation's facility at Draper, Utah, shortly before 7:00 o'clock
p.m., and was stopped on the main line track adjacent to defendant's facility headed generally in an eastbound compass direction.
10.

Immediately to the north of the Leased Premises,

were three sets of railroad tracks as shown in the print marked
Exhibit "K", and by this reference made a part hereof.

The

trackage immediately north of defendant's facility is identified

as the "Poultry Track", the center track is identified as the
"Main Line Track", and the track to the north of the Leased
Premises

i~

identified as the "Passing Track".

The area north

of defendant's facility and north of where the tracks are located
is fenced by the land owner on the north, said fence running
east and west.

See three photographs taken September 26, 1975,

and marked Exhibit "Q", attached hereto, and by this reference
Qade a part hereof.

The area north of the fence referred to as

depicted in these photographs, is not owned by or leased by
Intermountain Farmers.
11.

The

~o

locomotive units (3645-A and 137-B) were

detached from the balance of the train remaining on the main
line trackage, pulled forward beyond the switch into the poultry track, and subsequently backed in a westerly direction along
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the poultry track adjacent to the lntermountain Farmers Association's facility.

12.

At the time of this backward movement along the

poultry track, the engineer, an employee of plaintiff, was
operating the

~vo

locomotive units from the east locomotive

(3645-A) seated at the controls located on the south side of
the east locomotive cab.
13.

The brakeman, Levi Ki Tua' one, an employee of

plaintiff, was riding the west locomotive (137-B), on the southwest corner thereof.

He was a student brakeman and this was

his third road trip out of the yard.
14.

The lead or west locomotive unit identified as

137-B which entered the poultry track first had two headlights
operating at the time to illuminate the track and right of way.
These headlights, located one above the other on the horizontal
center line of the locomotive, approximately 12 feet 5 inches
above the rail, were seven inches in diameter and produced a
total beam candle power of 600,000 units.

The brakeman claims

there was plenty of light to see the tracks as they were backing.

He said he bad no trouble seeing where he was going.

(Deposition of Tua'one, pages 9 and 34).
15.

The purpose of the westerly inbound movement

was to pick up two empty but separated boxcars located on the
poultry track serving the defendant.

These Dvo boxcars

(UP 165227 and LN 12470) et the time of the inbound move were
located over the bare spots in the snow depicted
16.

in Exhibit "D".

During the westerly inbound move on the poultry

track, the southwest steps of unit 137-B upon which the brakeman was riding at the time, must have passed by or over the
spool of cable; however, the brakeman claims he did not observe
the spool of cable.

He says he was maintaining a lookout and

did not see any obstruction or obstacle to the movement of che
train.
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17.

Plaintiff's employees claici they were performing

their duties for the railro2d company in the customary and
routine manner under the circumstances.

The railroad company

procedure is such that before backing a train, the track must
be free from obstruction to train movement and the track must
either be seen during the movement or known to be clear.

(Richins'

Deposition, page 53).
18.

During the west bound movement on the poultry

track, Conductor Richins, who had been riding the caboose from
Salt Lake City to Draper, had dismounted from the caboose and
had walked easterly between the main line track and the poultry
track to assist in the switching operation being conducted on
the poultry track.

(Second Deposition of Richins, pages 22 and

23).

19.

"Q.

Mr. Richins stated in his deposition,

Did you know when you left the yard to go south that

he was a new man

Q.

a new brakeman?

A.

Yes.

A.

Yes.

This is why

I was going up to help.

Q.

Had he been an experienced brakeman would you have left

the caboose that night?

A.

I'd have left the

caboose but chances are I wouldn't have concentrated so
much on the work that was at hand.

I would have --

there are other duties that I have that I could have
been doing.
Q.

You would have allowed him -- if he had been an

experienced brake.,,an you would have allowed him to do
the connecting

himsel~?

A.

That's right.

Q.

You wouldn't have assisted in doing that necessarily

unless he asked?
to be there.

A.

Unless I happened

If I had arrived there at a time when I

could assist I'd assist, but in

insp~cting

the crain,
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when I walk up, instead of concentrating so much on
getting up there helping him, I would have spent
more time looking the train over."

(Second Deposition

of Richins, pages 22 and 23).
20.

After che two locor.'otives reached the first car

on the poultry track, identified as UP 165227, the brakeman
made the connection between the two locomotives and said car.
21.

Conductor Richins, who by this time had arrived

at the west car on the poultry track (LN 12470), transmitted
instructions to the engineer by walkie-talkie radio which he
was carrying to facilitate the coupling
LN 12470.

be~{een

UP 165227 and

The track where the switching was being conducted

was curved in such a manner that the engineer could not see to
the rear of the train and visually receive signals from the
brakeman or conductor, so the conductor was transmitting signals
by radio in the customary and authorized manner under such
circumstances.

22.

After the coupling had been completed and the

brake airlines charged, Conductor Richins advised the engineer
by walkie-talkie radio to commence the eastbound movement in
order to return to the main line trackage and the balance of
the train.
23.

As the movement commenced, Conductor Richins and

the brakeman simultaneously stepped aboard the southwest corner
of trailing locomotive 137-B.

Richins testified that he would

not have mounted the train as it moved out to the main line buc
would have walked over to the caboose if it hadn't been for the
rubbish, slimy dust, bran dust or grain on the ground in the
area.

(See Richins' deposition, page 28, lines 1-5; page 3L,

lines 6-11; page 35, lines 5-13, 22-25; and page 36, lines 1-2).

24.
located on the

The brakeman claims he had both of his feet
botto~

step of trailing

loco~otive

137-B, as
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depicted in the photograph marked Exhibit "L", and Conductor
Richins claims he had his right foot on the bottom step and
left foot on the foot board, as depicted in said Exhibit "L".
Richins said both men were crowding onto the same area but that
such a situation was not abnormal or unusual with a student
brakeman.

(Second Deposition of Richins, page 18).
25.

After the movement had obtained the speed of

approximately three to five miles per hour and had moved approximately two boxcar lengths, Conductor Richins claims he was
knocked off the moving train by the spool of cable owned by the
defendant and depicted in Exhibits "E.", "F", "G", "H", and

"I",

precipitating the injuries sustained.
26.

At the time of the accident, Conductor Richins

was riding the train movement on the south side of the poultry
track next to the Intermountain Farmers Association's facility,
under lease to the defendant.

The spool of one-half inch steel

cable, as depicted in the photographs marked Exhibits "E", "F",
"G", "H", and

"!", at the time of the accident was located with-

in eight (8) feet six (6) inches from the center line of the
poultry track immediately adjacent to the Leased Premises.
27.

Neither plaintiff nor any of its employees,

agents, servants, etc., claims to have been aware of or to have
observed the subject spool of cable at anytime prior to the
accident.
28.

After the accident, the spool of cable owned by

defendant was observed to be located approximately one foot south
of the south rail of the poultry track in the location shown in
the photographs marked Exhibits

"E", "Frr, "G", "H", and "I".

The distance between the rails of the poultry track was four (4)
feet eight and one-half
29.

(8~)

inches.

Defendant claims to have last seen the spool of

cable located right next to its building immediately south of
the poultry track where the accident occurred.

At about 11:00
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o'cloc~

a.m. on the day prior to the accident, an employee of

defendant, Robert W. Turley, its plant

~anager,

tion of the building, by walking along the

sa~e.

made an inspecSuch inspec-

wee~<.

(Turley deposition,

pages 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 36 and 37).

Turley saw no spool

tions were made approximacely once a

of cable in the track area, nor had he ever seen this spool
prior to the accident.
30.

(Turley Deposition, pages 14, 15 and 37).

Defendant's employees disclaim having any know-

lege as to how the spool of cable got to its location at or
near the

trac~

on the night of the accident.

The night of the

accident in question was Halloween night.
31.

The dimensions of the spool were approximately

one (1) foot in height by two (2) feet four (4) inches in length.
Attached to the spool was some one-half inch

(~)

steel cable.

The defendant claims it never used the spool and cable.
32.

By letter, dated December 15, 1972, plaintiff

advised defendant in writing of the subject accident, expressed
the opinion that legal action was apparent, and provided defendant full opportunity to defend or participate in the disposi-.
tion thereof.

(A copy of said letter, marked Exhibit

"M"

is

attached hereto).
33.

On or about January 29, 1973, said Richard V.

Richins filed an action alleging negligent conduct against the
Railroad, in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, entitled "Richard V. Richins vs. Union
Pacific Railroad Company", identified as Ci·Jil Number 210084,
de~anding

judgment for injuries sustained in the above-described

accident in the sum of $750,000.00; such action was brought
under and by virtue of the provisions of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. Section 51, et seq.
34.

On February 21, 1973, the Railroad notified

Inter~ountain Farme~s

in writing of the pend2ncy of such action
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and again provided Intermountain Farmers full opportunity to
defend the Railroad or participate in the defense against
Richins' lawsuit.

A copy of said notification is attached here-

to marked Exhibit "N", and by this reference made a part hereof.

By letter, dated March 22, 1973, Intermountain Farmers declined
to accept tender of the case.
35.

By a hand-delivered letter, dated and delivered

October 24, 1973, the Railroad advised Intermountain Farmers
that, following extensive settlement negotiations with Richard V.
Richins' legal counsel, the Railroad had agreed to compromise
Mr. Richins' case for $162,500.00.

In said letter, the Railroad

requested that Intermountain Farmers be prepared to tender the
compromise payment of $162,500.00 to Mr. Richins at the settlement conference scheduled for October 31, 1973.

A copy of said

letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "O", and by this reference
made a part hereof.
36.

On

October 31, 1973, the Railroad, by way of

compromise and in order to settle Mr. Richins' action and
secure a release, paid to said Richard V. Richins the sum of
$162,500.00.

Intermountain Farmers' name was included in the

Release, but not by its request.

A copy of said Release is

attached hereto as Exhibit "P", and by this reference made a
part hereof.
37.

At all times mentioned herein, Intermountain

Farmers rejected the tender of defense of the claim and suit
brought by Mr. Richins and rejected any and all offers of the
Railroad to enter into negotiations and/or settlement of
Richins 1 suit.
38.

On or about November 15, 1973, the Railroad

instituted this action to recover from the Interraountain

Farmers said $162,500.00, together with defense costs and
expenses in the sum of $1,195.00, reasonable attorneys' fees
in the sum of $1,840.00, and decositions expenses of $97.50,
for a total sum of $165,632.50.
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39.

Under the ?rovisions of the Feder2l Employers'

Liability Act herein referred to, a jury issue was presented
as to whether or

n~t

the Railroad was negligent and

~ould

have

been held legally liable to Richard V. Richins for the injuries
he sustained as described above, and the Railrcad could have
been held legally liable by a jury or court for such injuries
sustained.
40.

It is agreed by the parties that the settlement

made by the Railroad with Conductor Richins in his lawsuit
under the provisions of said Federal Employers' Liability Act
is deemed reasonable in all respects, including all costs and
attorneys' fees.
41.

The respective parties further stipulate that all

depositions taken in this action may be published and used by
the Court for the purpose of making its decision herein.
GENERAL NATURE OF THE CLAIHS OF THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES
A.

Plaintiff contends that it is entitled to indemnifica-

tion under one or more of the following theories:
1.

Full indemnity under either contractural indemnity
and/or implied indemnity;

2.

Contribution under Section 78-27-39, U.C.A, 1953
(Supp. 1973);

3.
B.

Application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

Defendant contends:
1.

There is no indemnity, either contractural or
implied, from defendant to plaintiff for the
injuries to Richins;

2.

At the

ci~e

be~.Jee'1.

of the accident and inju=ies to

~here

Richins,

was no right of contribution

joint tort feasors.

herein is

deter~ined

-10-

If defe!"l.dant

to be a tore

fe~sor,
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which it denies, Title 78-27-39, U.C.A 1953,
(Supp. 1973) has no application as it was
passed by the Legislature and became law
subsequent to the accident involving
Richins;
3.

Denies the application of the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur.

The foregoing Stipulation is hereby agreed to and
entered into this

~

day of April, 1976.

>@2:1%f.,,.,
/"~'~
/

_,/ Attorneys for Plaintiff
Union Pacific Railroad Company
10 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
BAYLE AND LAUCHNOR

By

'"'f?
l'
-f
1,-1-.--',1 ( \._,.._... _,,C....c_
F. Robert Bayle-'!
Attorneys forJJifendant
Intermountain Farmers Association
1105 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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